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CAN INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
JUSTIFY STRATEGIC TRADE POLICIES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper  examines  the relationship  between  labor  market 
imperfections  and trade policies.  The available  evidence  suggests 
that pervasive  industry  wage differentials  of up to 20 percent 
remain  even after controlling  for differences  in observed  measures 
of workers'  skill and the effects of unions.  Theoretical  analysis 
indicates  that given non—competitive  wage differentials  of this 
magnitude  policies directed  at encouraging  employment  in high-wage 
sectors could  significantly  enhance allocative  efficiency.  For the 
United States and  other developed  countries,  such policies  are more 
likely to involve export promotion  than  import substitution. 
Increased  international  trade  flows  (at  least through  1984) have 
been associated  with increased  employment  in high-wage  U.S. 
manufacturing  industries  relative  to low—wage U.S.  manufacturing 
industries. 
Lawrence F. Katz  Lawrence H. Summers 
Department of Economics  Department of  Economics 
Harvard University  Harvard University 
Cambridge, MA  02138  Cambridge, MA  02138 I.  Introduction 
Industrial  policies  have been a  major  source  of economic  and 
political  debate  in the United  States  and other nations  in recent 
years.  Advocates  of industrial  policies  assert  that since all 
public policies inevitably  influence the composition  of output  and 
some  industries  are  "better"  for a national economy  than others,  it 
is appropriate  for governments  to manage their  influence  on the 
economy to promote goals like growth and competitiveness. 
Industrial  policy  advocates  often  cite Japan as an example  of a 
nation that has benefitted  from sound industrial  policies.  Critics 
of industrial  policy have generally  cited standard economic 
arguments  against such policies,  suggesting  that  in competitive  or 
nearly  competitive  markets,  there are no gains to be had from 
altering  the composition  of output. 
In tandem  with  political  debates over  industrial  policy,  a 
burgeoning  academic  literature  on strategic  trade policy,  initiated 
by Brander and Spencer  (1983, 1984)  and surveyed  in Krugman  (1986), 
has  examined policy  measures  that can shift monopoly  rents  from one 
nation to another when product markets  are imperfectly  competitive. 
A central  focus in this literature  has been  on imperfections  in 
product markets,  especially  markets with large learning  curve 
effects.  While this literature  has yielded  intriguing 
counterexamples  to some widely  believed  propositions,  we believe 
that  its emphasis  on product  market  imperfections  as the potential 2 
rationale  for industrial  policies  is somewhat  misplaced.1 
We suspect  that deviations  from competitive  labor markets  which 
give rise to significant  inter-industry  wage differentials  are at 
least equally  important  for  industrial policy  as are product  market 
imperfections.  Industrial  policy  advocates  like Robert Reich and 
Lester  Thurow, who encourage  subsidies  for "high value added 
production",  appear to be referring  not to especially  profitable 
industries,  but to industries  that pay high wages.  The 
international  pervasiveness  of subsidies  to steel  industries  is 
probably  more easily  understood  on the basis of their high  wage jobs 
than on the basis  of the profits  earned  by steel companies. 
The observation  that rents accruing  to labor are much more 
significant  than monopoly  rents received  by firms is a very general 
one.  For the American  non—financial  corporate  sector  in 1987, 
employee  compensation  represented  82 percent  of value  added while 
operating  profits represented  only 18 percent,  with  the bulk of the 
latter figure being  the  return to capital rather  than monopoly 
rents.  It follows that the labor rents associated  with industry 
wage differentials  of even 10 percent bulk  very large when compared 
with plausible  estimates  of firms' monopoly  rents.2 
LA prominent  exception  to this criticism  is Krugman (1984), who 
emphasizes  the potential  importance  of wage differentials  caused  by 
unions. 
2The presumption  that  labor rents are much  greater  than rents 
received  by firms does  not necessarily  mean that  product  market 
imperfections  are a minor  source  of rents.  A  large fraction  of the 
rents earned by workers  may arise from the ability  of both  union and 
nonunion  labor to share in product market rents.  For example, 
Salinger  (1984) presents  evidence indicating  that union  labor 
captures most of the monopoly  rents  in heavily  unionized This paper explores  both theoretically  and empirically  the 
implications  of labor market imperfections  for trade  policies, 
focusing on the situation  of the United  States  in the  1980s.  We 
begin  in Section  II by demonstrating  that,  contrary to competitive 
labor market  theories,  there are  substantial  differences  between 
industries  in the compensation  received  by workers  with  similar 
characteristics  working  under apparently  similar conditions.  The 
industrial  wage structure  is remarkably  stable across time  and 
space.  While unions are a partial  source of these wage 
differentials,  wage differentials  are  large for non—union  workers 
and in settings  like the American  South, where union threats  are not 
very important.  The differentials  appear to arise from  the 
differential  importance  of motivating,  retaining,  and recruiting 
workers  as suggested  by the efficiency  wage theories  surveyed  in 
Katz  (1986) and  from rent—sharing  considerations. 
Section  III considers  theoretically  the  implications  of non— 
competitive  wage differentials  for trade and  industrial  policies. 
We find that  inter—industry  wage differences  provide  a rationale  for 
policies  quite similar  to those  that have been advanced  by 
industrial  policy advocates.  While it is difficult  to justify 
subsidizing  industries  that achieve  high value added per worker by 
relying  on abnormally  skilled workers  or by using a great deal  of 
capital or other inputs, there  is a rationale  for subsidizing 
industries  that have high value  added per worker because  of non- 
competitive  wage differentials.  If firms hire labor to the point 
industries. 4 
where its marginal product  equals the wage, the marginal 
productivity  of an additional  worker is greater  in sectors  paying 
premium  wages than  in competitive  wage sectors.  In this  case, 
policy  measures that expand employment  in high—wage  sectors  may be 
desirable.  Of course, the basic thrust of this theoretical  argument 
is not new.  The  role of factor market distortions  in the  design of 
optimal  trade policies  has played  a prominent  role in trade theory 
at least since the work of Hagen  (1958) and of Shagwati and 
Ramaswani (1963).  Furthermore,  both stylized  calculations  and 
consideration  of actual examples  suggest that  these effects  may well 
be quantitatively  important. 
Section IV combines  data on industry wage  premiums  with data on 
trade flows to assess the importance  of wage differentials  for trade 
policies.  We reach three primary conclusions.  First, wage 
differentials  cause the United  States to reap extra gains  from 
trade,  at least within  the manufacturing  sector.  US manufacturing 
exports come disproportionately  from industries  that pay premium 
wages, while  manufacturing  imports generally  come from low-wage 
sectors.  Second,  exporting  high—wage  goods  while importing  lower— 
wage goods  is a characteristic  common  to other developed  countries. 
Third, despite  concerns  about undesirable  changes in the  structure 
of the US economy,  it does not appear (at least through  1984) that 
changing  trade patterns  have disproportionately  hurt the high-wage 
portion  of the US manufacturing  sector.  Instead,  increased  import 
competition  has had  its greatest  impact on employment  in low-wage 
parts  of the U.S. manufacturing  sector. 5 
Section V  concludes  the paper by offering  a tentative 
assessment  of the implications  of our results  for actual trade 
industrial  and tax policies.  Our general view is that policies 
directed  at reducing  imports are likely to have extremely  adverse 
impacts on economic  welfare,  whereas  certain measures  aimed at 
expanding  employment  in export sectors may  increase  welfare.  Any 
economic  case  for activist  policy must be tempered  by a recognition 
that theoretically  optimal policies  are extremely  unlikely  to be 
implemented  in practice. 
II.  The  Inmortance  of Inter-Industry  Wage  Differentials 
Several recent  studies have documented  large  and persistent 
wage  differentials  among industries,  even after controlling  for a 
wide  variety  of worker  and job characteristics  (Dickens and Katz, 
l987a,b; Krueger  and Summers,  1987, 1988; and Murphy  and Topel, 
l987).  The pattern  of these differentials  is remarkably  parallel 
in looking at data for different  countries  and time periods  and 
suggests that  workers in some  sectors earn substantial  rents. This 
section  summarizes  the  available  evidence  on the  inter—industry  wage 
structure  and discusses  the consistency  with the evidence  of 
alternative  models  of wage  determination.  We conclude  that 
competitive  labor  market  explanations  stressing  unmeasured  labor 
quality and compensating  differertia1s  do not provide  a plausible 
3This  conclusion  is hardly new. It was noted by Adam  Smith, 
highlighted  by Sumner Slichter (1950), and has been emphasized  by 
institutionally—  oriented  labor economists  for many years. 6 
explanation  for a substantial  component of inter—industry  wage 
variations,  even for non—union  workers.  Instead,  industry  wage 
differentials  largely reflect  firms' differing  needs to use high 
wages to motivate,  retain and recruit their  workers. 
The Magnitude  of Inter-Industry  Wage Differences 
We analyze  industry wage differences  in the United  States using 
cross—sectional  data  on individuals  from the 1984  Current Population 
Surveys.  All  twelve CPS  surveys from 1984 were combined  to generate 
a sample  large enough to accurately  estimate  wage differentials  for 
detailed  industry  categories.4  Our sample consists of private 
sector, nonagricultural  employees  16 years  old or older.  The 
earnings variable  is usual weekly earnings divided  by usual  weekly 
hours.5  The procedures  utilized  are described  in Krueger  and 
Summers  (1988).  In particular,  we normalize  the estimated  wage 
differentials  as deviations  from the  (employment-weighted)  mean 
differential. 
The first column  in Table  1 reports the proportionate 
difference  in wages  between the average worker  in a two-digit  Census 
industry  and the weighted  average worker  in all  industries.  The 
second column reports  the normalized  industry wage  differences  after 
controlling  for education,  age, occupation,  gender,  race, marital 
4  .  Although  the CPS  is partially  a panel data  set, only 
individuals  in outgoing  rotation groups  are asked about earnings. 
Further, people  exit the sample only  once a year. Thus,  all 
observations  reflect unique  individuals. 
5We eliminated  employees  who  reported  earning  less that  $1.00 
an hour or greater than $250 an hour. Table  1:  Estimated  Industry Log Wage  Differentials 
-  -  Full Year 1984 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All -  Total 
All  All  Compensation  Nonunion 
Without 
Industry  Controls 
With  b 
Controls 
With  b 
Controls 
With  b 
Controls 
Mining  .396  .268  .280  .273 
Construction  .163  .113  .100  .068 
Lumber  - .118  - .030  .007  .007 
Furniture 
- .120  - .035  - .014  .005 
Stone  Clay  & Glass  .084  .070  .124  .066 
Primary Metals  .269  .169  .270  .166 
Fabricated  Metals  .128  .077  .138  .082 
Machinery  Excl. Elec.  .299  .149  .186  .177 
Electrical  Machinery  .177  .085  .114  .10] 
Transport  Equipment  .375  .211  .288  .194 
Instruments  .247  .110  .139  .158 
Misc.  Manufacturing 
- .102  - .062  - .041 
- .015 
Food  .039  .052  .105  .041 
Tobacco  .248  .236  .424  .213 
Textile 
- .146  - .002  .010  .048 
Apparel 
- .358 
- .153  - .149  - .111 
Paper  .220  .168  .205  .149 
Printing  .055  .033  .037  .034 
Chemical  .343  .192  .237  .223 
Petroleum  .490  .294  .543  .292 
Rubber  .090  .101  .146  .132 
Leather  - .294  - .134  - .113 
- .090 
Other Transport  .245  .179  .208  .092 
Communications  .385  .250  .373  .215 Table  I (continued) 
astandard  errors  are not reported  to save apace. In  all cases 
errors  are between  .004 and .020 except  for Tobacco  which  has atandard 
errors which  range  froa .039 to  .049. 
b 
Controls  include education  and its square; six age dummies;  eight occupation 
dummies;  female  dummy;  race dummy;  SMSA dummy;  3 region  dummies;  full-time 
work dummy;  full- and part-time  student dummies;  interactions  of the female 
dummy  with  marriage,  education,  education  squared,  and the 6 age dummies;  and 
a constant.  Each  column  was estimated  from  a separte  cross-sectional 
regression. 
c 




Industry  Controls 
Public Utilities 
Wholesale  Trade 
Eating and Drinking 




Business  Services 
Repair  Services 
Personal  Services 
Entertainment 
Medical  Services 
Hospitals 
Welfare  Services 
Education  Services 
Professional  Services 
Sample  Size 
Weighted  adjusted 
S.D. of differentialsc 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
All -  Total 
All  Compensation  Nonunion 
With  With  With 
Controlsa  Controlaa  Controlsa 
.201  .278  .192 
.040  .018  .058 
- .244  - .274  - .228 
- .139  - .169  - .138 
.048  .077  .066 
.049  .053  .069 
- .339  - .490  - .312 
-.015  -.046  .004 
- .085  - .115  - .053 
- .180  - .219  - .161 
- .130  - .151  - .144 
- .034  - .030  - .014 
.060  .064  .077 
- .203  - .286  - .207 
- .078  - .099  - .105 
.091  .052  .105 


















.270  .144  .185  .141 
the standard 7 
status, SMSA,  full-tine work,  student status, and allowing  many of 
the coefficients  to differ  for males and  females.  Controlling  for 
available  worker  characteristics  has  little impact on the rankings 
of different  industries;  the correlation  of the  industry  wage 
differentials  estimated  with and without  controls  is 0.96.  This 
finding suggests  that  comparisons  of average industry  wages over 
time and across countries  may be useful since  it is unlikely  that 
controls  would change  one's inferences  about the relative  rankings 
of industries  in the wage structure. 
The controls  do substantially  reduce the estimated  inter- 
industry dispersion  of wages.  The standard deviation  of the 
estimated  wage differentials  falls from 27 percent  without  controls 
to  14 percent  when controls are added.  Almost  all of this decline 
is attributable  to holding occupation  and sex constant.  Industry 
affiliation  has a large  impact on relative wages even allowing  for 
observed  differences  in occupation, human capital variables,  and 
demographic  background.  Industry  differentials  range from a high of 
29 percent  above the mean in petroleum  to 34 percent below the mean 
in private  household  services.  Durable goods manufacturing,  mining, 
and chemicals  industries  pay wages well above those  for workers  in 
retail trade and  service industries,  all else constant.  Substantial 
wage differentials  are also apparent  within the traded-goods 
(manufacturing)  sector. 
One possibility  is that these differentials  largely  serve to 
offset differences  in nonwage compensation.  One non—wage aspect  of 
compensation  which we can control  for using our data  is fringe 8 
benefits.  Fringe benefits account  for as much as 50 percent  of 
compensation  in some  industries.  To adjust  for variation  in fringes 
across industries,  we multiplied  our CPS hourly  wage data  for each 
worker  in the sample  by the ratio of total  labor costs to wages in 
the corresponding  industry.6  The third column  of Table  1 presents 
estimates  of industry  wage differentials  with  the dependent  variable 
adjusted  to reflect  both  wage and nonwage compensation.7  The 
estimated  standard  deviation  of industry  differentials  actually 
increases  by more than one—fourth  from 14.4 to 18.5 percent.  Thus, 
the  consideration  of fringe benefits  reinforces,  rather than 
reduces,  industry  compensation  differences. 
Discussions  of industry wage differences  frequently  emphasize 
the  importance  of unions  in wage setting.  The  inclusion  of union 
membership  and union coverage  dummy variables  in the specification 
reported  in the  second column of Table 1,  however, has little  impact 
on the estimated  industry differentials.  The standard  deviation  of 
the differentials  falls from 14.4 to 13.9 percent.  Since unions  are 
likely to have different  impacts on wages in industries  with 
different  product  market  structures  and costs of strikes,  a better 
approach  is to assess the  importance  of industry  differentials  for a 
6The industry  labor cost and wage data are  reported  in the 
National  Income and Product  Accounts  (NIPA) and were previously 
utilized  in Krueger and Summers  (1988). 
7Since  the NIPA and CPS industry  classification  schemes do not 
match exactly,  caution  should be taken in comparing  the results  in 
column  (3). 9 
sample containing  only  nonunion  workers.8  Column (4)  of Table  1 
presents  these.  The  industry wage  premia are quite substantial  for 
nonunion  workers.  We also estimated  differentials  for the union 
workers  in our sample and found the standard deviation  of the 
di±ferentials  to be slightly  larger for nonunion workers (14.1 to 
13.3 percent).  The correlation  of the differentials  for the union 
and nonunion  samples is 0.80.  There appears to be little difference 
in the process  generating  industry  relative  wages  in the union and 
no:nunion  sectors.  Further evidence  that unions  are not the primary 
factor accounting  for wage differentials  comes  from Krueger  and 
Summers'  (1988) finding that the wage structure  in the Southern  part 
of the United  States looks very similar to that  in the rest of the 
country despite  much lower rates of unionization. 
Regularities  in the  Inter—Industry  Wage Structure 
Industry  wage differences  appear to be quite stable  across time 
and  space.  Krueger  and Summers  (1987) examine  evidence  on the 
industry  wage structure  in the United States  from  1900 to 1984. 
They  find that between  1900 and  1984 the correlation  between 
relative  wages  in nine  major industries  is 0.62 and between  1970 and 
1984 the correlation  is 0.91.  Krueger  and Summers  further  document 
that  the relative  rankings  of industry average  wages in detailed 
manufacturing  industries  is also extremely  stable over  time.  Figure 
8The nonunion  sample consists  of workers not covered  by 
collective  bargaining  agreements.  The results  are almost  identical 
when the union membership  is used as the criterion  for excluding  a 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 plots  industry  wage differentials  for twenty  two—digit 
manufacturing  industries  estimated  from the May 1974 CPS against 
analogous  differentials  estimated  from the May 1984 CPS.9  Despite 
widespread  concern  about the impact of trade  on affected  industries, 
the  figure  illustrates  that the industry wage structure  in 
manufacturing  has been very stable over the  last decade.  Freeman 
and Katz  (1987) study the effects of import competition  on wages in 
US manufacturing  and find that a 10 percent  decrease in industry 
revenues  front increased  import penetration  reduces an industry's 
relative wage for production  workers by only 0.5 percent.10 
Industry  wage patterns  are remarkably  similar among countries 
with diverse  labor market institutions.  Table 2 presents  evidence 
on the remarkable  similarity  of relative wages in manufacturing 
among 9 countries  in 1982.  The use of a single occupational  group 
(operatives)  allows us to control  for skill mix differences  across 
countries.  The cross—country  correlations  of relative wages are 
quite high,  typically  between  0.6 and 0.9.  For example, the 
correlation  between the relative  wages of operatives  in the U.S.  and 
Japan  is 0.95.  We illustrate this  similarity  in the wage  structures 
of U.S. and Japan in Figure  2.  Krueger and Summers  (1987) also find 
strong positive  correlations  in relative  average  industry wages 
9The estimates  are taken  from Table  II of Krueger and Summers 
(1988)  . 
101n  contrast,  Murphy and Welch  (1988) document  that the 
earnings  of "skilled"  (college—educated)  workers  rose dramatically 
relative  to those of less—educated  workers  from 1979 to 1985.  They 
provide  some suggestive  evidence  that  increased  net imports  in 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































among a larger group of countries.  The stability  in differentiala 
across time periods  and countries  strongly  suggests that these wage 
differences  result from factors  fundamental to the operation  of 
industrial  economies  and are not the  artifact  of particular 
collective  bargaining  systems  or government  interventions  in the 
labor market. 
The  industry wage structure  also  appears to be very similar  for 
different  types of workers.  Dickens and Katz  (1987b) find that 
inter—industry  wage differentials  are highly correlated  across 
occupations:  in industries  where one occupation  is highly  paid,  all 
occupations  tend to be highly  paid.  For example, they find that the 
correlation  in industry average  wages  for managers  and laborers  in 
0.83,  even after controlling  for worker  characteristics. 
Furthermore,  Krueger and Summers  (1988) show that the pattern of 
differentials  is quite  similar for young and old workers  and for 
workers  with short and long job tenure. 
The Characteristics  of High— and Low—Wage Industries 
The evidence  summarized  above  indicates that there exists  a 
pattern  of wage differentials  in which all workers  in some 
industries  are paid  more than similar workers  in other  industries. 
This raises the  question  of what are the attributes  of high- and 
low-wage  industries.  Dickens and Katz  (1987a) review  the literature 
on the relations  among  industry characteristics  and  industry  wages. 
They  find that even after controlling  for observed human capital, 
geographic,  and demographic  variables,  both  union and nonunion  wages 12 
are positively  correlated  with capital—intensity,  neasures  of 
product market  power and ability—to—pay,  union density,  average 
education  level, and  firm and establishment  size.  High-wage 
industries  also have much lower quit rates  than low—wage  industries. 
The characteristics  of high—wage  and low—wage  industries  in 
U.S.  manufacturing  are  illustrated  in Figures 3a—3d.  The tendency 
of capital  intensive  industries  (and those with a low labor share) 
to pay high  wages is apparent.  The relation  between  R&D spending 
and wages is less clear cut.  Unfortunately,  as Dickens and Katz 
note, it is not possible  to reliably  disentangle  the  independent 
effects of these  factors on wages. 
Do Industry  Wage  Differentials  Reflect Labor Rents? 
The  competitive  labor market  model offers two types of 
explanations  for persistent  inter—industry  wage differentials. 
These differentials  may compensate  for nonpecuniary  differences  in 
job attributes,  or they  may reflect differences  in unmeasured  labor 
quality.  If compensating  differentials  and unobserved  ability 
adequately  explain the bulk  of measured  industry  wage differences, 
then the presence  of large  industry wage differentials  should not be 
an important  consideration  in the evaluation  of trade policies. 
Inter—industry  wage differences  do not appear  to be easily 
explained  by compensating  differentials,  for several reasons. 
First,  Krueger and Summers  (1988)  find that the inclusion  of 
controls  for observable  differences  in working conditions  tends  to 
increase  rather than decrease  estimates  of the extent  of inter— Figure  .1 
Pre,ma vs Ya1ue Added per VurMer 
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industry wage  variation.  Furthermore,  the  estimates  in Table  1 
indicate that the consideration  of fringe benefits leads to 
substantially  larger  estimates  of industry  compensation  differences. 
Thus,  the consideration  of observed  nonwage compensation  exacerbates 
the industry  differentials. 
Second, the strong correlation  in inter—industry  wage 
differences  across occupations  is also difficult  to explain  through 
equalizing  differences,  since it is unlikely  that whenever  working 
conditions  are poor for production  workers  they are also poor  for 
managers,  secretaries,  and salesmen.  Third, Pencavel  (1970) and 
many others have shown that there is a strong  negative  correlation 
between  industry wage differentials  and quit  rates.  Furthermore, 
Holzer, Katz  and Krueger  (1988) find that high-wage  industries 
attract a greater  number  of job applicants per opening  than do low- 
wage  industries.  These  findings  strongly  suggest that  workers in 
high-wage  industries  earn rents. 
An alternative  competitive  explanation  of these wage 
differences  is that they largely reflect differences  in workers' 
productive  abilities  that are not captured by the variables 
available  in individual—level  data sets.  While it is almost  certain 
that unobserved  quality differences  account  for much  of the 
variation  in the wages that  workers with similar observed 
characteristics  receive,  this does  not necessarily  imply that 
differences  in the average  wage paid in different  industries  are the 
result of differences  in the average level of unobserved  ability. 
Four types of evidence  suggest that it is unlikely  that a large part 14 
of measured  inter—industry  wage differences  can be accounted  for by 
unmeasured  ability. 
First, Krueger  and Summers  (1988) find that  after controlling 
for sex and occupation,  controlling  for other skill variables  like 
education  and experience  has only a very small  impact on the 
dispersion  of industry wages.  This is because  there are only  minor 
differences  in educational  attainment  and in experience  across 
industries  after controlling  for differences  in occupational 
composition.  Given the absence of a high degree  of industrial 
sorting on the basis  of observed  labor quality  proxies,  a high 
degree  of sorting  on unobserved  characteristics  would be surprising. 
Second,  Krueger  and Summers  (1988) present  longitudinal 
evidence  that when individual  workers move between  industries, 
either because  of displacement  or because of normal labor  market 
processes,  their wages change by amounts similar  to the  industry 
11 
differentials  estimated  in cross—sectional  regressions.  This 
finding casts  some doubt on the hypothesis  that  measured inter- 
industry wage differences  are  largely attributable  to unobserved 
productive  ability. 
Third, much evidence  indicates that more profitable  industries, 
those with  more monopoly  power,  and those where labor's  share is 
smaller, pay higher wages.  These regularities  hold  in different 
times and places  and explain a sizable fraction  of inter—industry 
See  Murphy and Topel  (1987) for contrasting  findings  using 
matched March CPS data.  Gibbons and Katz  (1987) discuss in detail 
potential  reasons  for differences  in findings  in alternative 
longitudinal  data sets. 15 
wage variation.  There  is no obvious reason why these product  market 
factors should be strongly  correlated  with unmeasured  ability. 
Fourth, the strong similarity  in wage differences  for different 
types of workers  is also problematic  for the unmeasured  ability 
view.  Why should  industry technologies  almost always  have such 
strong  skill complementarities  that those requiring  unusually  good 
operatives  require unusually  good  managers and clerical workers? 
Furthermore,  industry  differences  in observed  quality  measures for 
different  occupational  groups  do not appear to be nearly  as strongly 
correlated  as do their industry  wage differentials.  Dickens  and 
Katz  (1988) find that  industry  average education  levels are  only 
weakly positively  correlated  for many  occupations  and are negatively 
correlated  for some groups. 
Our  reading of the  evidence  is that it is difficult  to account 
convincingly  for the  industry wage structure  on the basis of 
unobserved  ability differences  or equalizing  differences.  Instead, 
i  appears that workers  in high  wage industries  earn rents. 
Alternative  Explanations  for Labor  Market Rents 
The natural  economic  approach to explaining  why  firms in high 
wage  industries  fail to cut wages in the absence of any legal 
compulsion,  is to isolate reasons why reducing  wages would be 
unprofitable  for a firm.  This is the approach taken in the  large 
and growing efficiency  wage literature.  The efficiency  wage 
literature,  surveyed  in Stiglitz  (1987) from a theoretical 
perspective  and Katz  (1986) from an empirical perspective,  has put 16 
forth a number  of possible  explanations  for fins' failure to cut 
wages in the  face of an excess supply of labor and their willingness 
to confer  rents on incumbent workers. 
A first explanation,  emphasized  by Shapiro  and Stiglitz  (1984) 
in the context of unemployment  and Bulow and Summers (1986) in the 
context  of wage differentials  emphasizes  the firms' need to deter 
their  workers from shirking.  Conferring  rents on them, which  will 
be forfeited  if they are caught shirking,  may be an efficient 
alternative  to more extensive monitoring  costs.  This theory may 
rationalize  the observation  that capital  intensive fins  and those 
offering  more job autonomy  pay higher wages because  the cost  of 
shirking  is higher  in these fins.  Krueger (1987) provides some 
supporting  evidence  by documenting  that fast  food fins  appear  to 
trade—off  wages and monitoring  effort. 
A second explanation  revolves  around fins' desire to avoid 
turnover  because  of fixed hiring  and training  costs.  This 
explanation  elegantly  modelled  by Stiglitz  (1985) is consistent  with 
the observation  that  wage  premia  appear to be somewhat  larger  for 
experienced  than  for inexperienced  workers.  It is also supported 
by frequent  references  to the need  to monitor  turnover  in personnel 
books.  A third related explanation  for fins' willingness  to confer 
rents  involves  adverse  selection  considerations  (Weiss, 1980).  If 
more able  workers  have higher  reservation  wages than their  less able 
counterparts,  fins that reduce wages  may find that  the average 
ability  of their work force declines  so rapidly that unit  labor 
costs  increase.  This  explanation  is consistent  with the complaints 17 
of some managers  that the  "wrong" workers quit in good times. 
While each of these explanations  can be formalized,  they appear 
insufficient  to fully account  for the observed pattern  of wage 
differentials.  A striking  feature of this pattern  is the similarity 
in industry wage patterns  for different  occupational  groups.  It is 
difficult  to see why workers  in industries with an especially  great 
need to motivate  and retain  operatives  should also have an 
especially  great need to motivate  and retain clerical  workers.  The 
similarity  of wage patterns  in different  occupations  along with  the 
observation  that monopoly power appears to influence  wages,  suggest 
that  firms for which production  interferences  are  especially  costly 
may pay  abnormally  high wages  even  in non—union  settings. 
This type of behavior can be justified  on the grounds  of "gift 
exchange"  theories  of the type advanced  by Akerlof (1984).  In these 
models,  a worker's  effort depends  on his perception  of how  fairly he 
is being  treated.  Perceived  fairness  in turn depends  on how 
profitable  the firm is.  A related  argument  might hold that  firms 
pay high wages to "buy the peace",  avoiding  unions or collective 
visible  shirking  of the kind that  Mathewson  (1969) and Mars (1982) 
find  in many industrial  settings.  The "peace" may be worth more to 
some  firms than others.  A final explanation  invokes  expense 
preference  behavior  on the part of managers,  who may particularly  at 
low  levels feel more loyalty  to employees  than shareholders.  If the 
efficiency  effects of wage  increases  described  in previous 
paragraphs  are important,  it may not be very costly  for firms to 
raise wages. 18 
Conclusion 
The evidence  in this section  suggests  that  industry wage 
differentials  for similar workers are substantial.  It appears  that 
these wage differentials  largely reflect rents earned  by workers in 
high wage industries.  No doubt,  industry  wage differences  result 
from a number  of sources.  Fortunately,  as we argue  in the next 
section,  the implications  of non—competitive  wage differentials  for 
trade policies  are  similar for a variety  of underlying  causes  of the 
differentials  as long as firms choose employment  levels on their 
labor demand curves. 
III.  Wace Differentials  and Trade Policies 
The basic argument  linking labor market  imperfections  and trade 
policies  has  long been recognized  by trade theorists  (see for 
example Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  (1983) and Magee (1976)).  It has 
been echoed, though  in a less clear  fashion,  in the American  debate 
over industrial  policies.  If competitive  forces do not equalize 
wages in different  sectors and  if firms operate on their labor 
demand curves, then the marginal product  of labor  in different 
sectors will  not be equated, resulting  in allocative  inefficiencies. 
Policies which raise employment  in high  wage sectors at the expense 
of employment  in low wage sectors will  therefore  increase allocative 
efficiency.  This line of argument  captures  the thrust  of industrial 
policy arguments  suggesting  that  countries  can raise their workers' 19 
standards  of living by encouraging  the growth  of "high value added 
industries". 
We begin by demonstrating  that the interaction  of trade 
policies  with wage differentials  has welfare  consequences  that are 
likely  to be more important  to the profit  shifting  effects  that have 
been the focus of recent discussions  of strategic  trade policy. 
Then  we examine  arguments  against subsidies  to employment  in high 
wage sectors based on rent seeking  and equity  considerations.  We 
conclWde  that on economic  grounds there  is a reasonably  strong 
welfare  argument  for measures  that  promote  production  in high wage 
industries,  though any policy judgment must depend on an assessment 
of how skillfully  the government  would  manage  its  interventions. 
Wage Differentials  In A Closed Economy 
For simplicity,  consider  a stylized  economy with  two sectors.12 
Following  the terminology  of Doeringer  and Piore  (1971), we label 
these sectors  secondary  and primary.  As we discuss below,  the 
primary sector  pays higher wages  and offers workers  more responsible 
jobs than  the secondary  sector.  Secondary  sector output,  taken as 
the numeraire,  is given by Y'=w0L.  The secondary  sector labor 
market  is competitive  so that workers  employed  in the secondary 
sector  receive a wage equal to their  marginal  product,  w0.  Primary 
sector  output  is given by the  constant  returns to scale production 
the cost of some complexity,  the special assumption  that 
capital  is not used  in producing  secondary  sector output  could be 
relaxed.  It does capture the stylized  fact noted  in the previous 
section  that high wage  sectors tend to be capital  intensive. 20 
function Y=F(K,L).  The demand  for primary  sector output  is a 
decreasing  function  of its price, p=p(y, p'<O.  We assume  that the 
wage differential,  d in the primary sector  is a nondecreasing 
function  of employment,  d=d(L),  d'￿0.13  It may depend positively 
on the level of employment  because workers' ability  to extract  rents 
is increased  when the demand  for labor  increases,  or because  the 
costs  of leaving a high—wage  job  is reduced when  there are more 
high—wage  jobs  in. the  economy. 
Assume initially  that the economy  is closed  and that the 
capital  stock is fixed.  Firms in the primary  and secondary  sector 
product  markets are  assumed to act competitively.  Then the first 
order condition: 
(1)  p(Y)FL(K,L) 
= w0(l+d) 
determines  the  level of primary  sector  employment.  This  level of 
primary sector employment  is inefficiently  low.  As Figure  4 
illustrates,  a subsidy to employment  in the. primary  sector at  a rate 
just sufficient  to offset the wage  differential  (l/(l+d)) would 
permit the economy to attain  the first best allocation  of labor)4 
Note that such a subsidy  imcreases  efficiency,  even though it may 
lead to a widening  of inter—industry  wage differentials.  We return 
below  to the question  of whether  or not it represents  a Pareto 
See  Bulow  and Summers  (1986) for an explicit  derivation  of a 
d(L )  schedule  from an efficiency  wage model. 
14The optimal  subsidy will be set at d(') whee L' is the 


















































So far we have maintained  the assumption  of perfect  competition 
in product  markets  and the assumption  that the capital  stock in each 
industry  is fixed.  Relaxing  these assumptions  tends to strengthen 
the case for policies directed  at expanding  the primary  sector.  If 
firms  in the primary  sector have market power, this is another 
reason  apart from wage premia  why the social marginal  product  of 
labor in the primary  sector exceeds the social marginal  product  of 
labor in the secondary  sector.  Put more directly:  there  is an 
efficiency  case for subsidizing  the variable inputs of a monopolist. 
Allowing  for variable  capital input strengthens  the case  for 
subsidies  to high-wage  industries.  If wage differentials  do not 
depend  on the capital  intensity  of the primary  sector,  then the 
appropriate  policy instrument  in the presence  of noncompetitive  wage 
differentials  is a wage subsidy.  If wage  differentials  are an 
increasing  function  of capital  intensity  as some rent—sharing 
theories  would suggest, then  there  is a case  for capital  investment 
subsidies  to offset the  "tax" levied by labor on capital 
investments. 
How substantial  are the potential  gains from public  policies 
directed  at offsetting  the effects of inter—industry  wage 
differentials?  One way of answering  this question is by comparing 
the efficiency  costs of inter-industry  wage differentials  with other 
distortions  that  have received  more attention  from economists. 
Section  II showed that the  standard deviation  of nonunion industry 
compensation  differences  after  correcting  for measured  ability 22 
differences  was  about 18%.  About 15% of private  sector American 
workers  are covered  by trade union agreements,  and it is generally 
estimated  that  their compensation  is about  20% above those of other 
workers.  If this were the only source of wage inequality,  the 
standard deviation  of wages would be approximately  7%.  This 
suggests that the allocative  inefficiency  attributable  to industry 
wage  effects  is at least comparable  to the efficiency  costs arising 
from union wage differentials. 
A different  standard  of comparison  is the distortionary 
consequence  of taxation.  Assuming  that  labor's share in output  is 
about three—quarters,  a 20% differential  in labor costs between  two 
sectors,  will  affect the product mix  in the same way as  a 60% 
capital  income tax, or a 15% sales tax. The former  figure is more 
than what is at stake  in the much  discussed  distortion  between 
corporate  capital  and owner occupied  housing.  Much smaller 
differentials  in effective  tax rates played a prominent  role  in the 
recent US tax reform debate.  Discussions  of sales taxes  invariably 
treat differences  of only a few percentage  points  in the  rates on 
included  and excluded  items as a serious problem. 
Inter—industry  wage differences  appear to cause allocative 
distortions  greater  than those resulting  from trade  unions  or the 
corporate  income tax.  A  different  way of demonstrating  their 
importance  is by evaluating  the marginal  social product of capital 
in the primary  sector  in their presence.  The value of output 
measured  at pre—intervention  prices  in our stylized  economy  is given 
by 23 
(2)  1 = pF(K,L)  + w0Lm, 
where L' + L = L  and L is the  fixed stock  of labor in the economy. 
Differentiating  (2) with respect to K, the primary  sector  capital 
stock, and then using both the  first order  condition (1)  and the 
assumption  that the primary  sector production  function  displays 
constant  returns to scale, we obtain the result: 
(3)  dY/dK = r(l+[ad/(l—a)(l+d)]), 
where I represents  the total value of national  income,  r is the 
return  received  by the  suppliers  of capital,  and a represents 
labor's  share in the primary  sector.  Taking labor's  share to be 
3/4,  and the wage differential  to be 2D%, this implies  that the 
marginal product  of additional  capital in the primary  sector  is 
inflated by 1/2 because  of the preexisting wage differential.  This 
suggests  that substantial  gains  may be achievable  by targeting 
investment  incentives  towards  high wage sectors. 
Wage Differentials  in a Small Open Economy 
In the case of a small open economy,  illustrated  in Figure  5, 
the relative  price of primary  sector output is determined  on 
international  markets and  is assumed to be unaffected  by the 
domestic  production  mix.  The demand function  p(1P) becomes 
perfectly  elastic.  This does not change the condition  (1)  or the 24 
desirability  of employment  subsidies  for the primary  sector. 
Opening  up the economy does however  strengthen  the case for large 
subsidies.  In a closed  economy,  subsidies  to the primary  sector 
encounter  diminishing  returns as its output declines  in value  with 
increased  production.  This does not happen when  the price of output 
is set on world markets  and is insensitive to the  level of domestic 
production. 
15 
There  is a further point to be made.  As Figure  5 illustrates, 
the marginal  welfare  gained per dollar  of subsidy  will be greater 
the greater  is the world price of primary sector  output.  As the 
world price of primary  sector output expands, and so domestic 
production  expands,  the wage differential  increases,  raising  the 
social gain to inducing further  expansion of the primary  sector. 
This observation  resonates  somewhat with  discussions  of industrial 
policy that claim that governments  should support "sunrise"  export 
industries  rather than  "sunset"  import competing  industries. 
We have focused on the desirability  of employment  or production 
subsidies  for the high wage  sector.  An obvious alternative  is 
protection,  through the exclusion  of foreign competition.  As 
illustrated  in Figure  6, protection  has the virtue of expanding  the 
15we focus  on the  "small open economy case" to highlight  the 
implications  of  wage differentials  for trade policy.  In the  case 
of open economies  large enough to affect the prices  at which they 
buy and sell, there are traditional  optimal tariff  considerations  as 
well.  These  suggest the desirability  of taxing  rather than 
subsidizing  exports  when expanding  exports can  lead to at least a 
moderate  terms—of—trade  deterioration.  In this  case, our analysis 
of employment  subsidies  is correct  if it is assumed that  optimal 
tariffs  (taxes) based on these traditional  considerations  are 
already  in place. Subsidies H 
Wages 
w 
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primary  sector  but the disadvantage  of raising  the consumer  price of 
the primary  sector good.  It is clear from  the figure that  the 
former effect  is first order while the latter  effect  is second 
order.  It follows that at least small movenents  towards protection 
will be welfare  enhancing,  though  they will be less desirable  than 
primary  sector employment  subsidies. This  is an illustration  of the 
general principle  discussed  by Bhagwati  and Srinivasan  (1983), that 
in the presence  of distortions,  policies  can be ranked,  with 
instruments  that most directly  address distortions  being preferred. 
Discussions  of activist  trade policies  typically  stress the 
potential  defect  that they invite retaliation,  which offsets  any 
initial benefits.  This argument  does not apply when  policy  options 
are limited to subsidies  directed  at capturing  1abr  market rents. 
In the model considered  here, it is true that countries  would  prefer 
that their subsidies  to primary sector output not meet retaliation. 
In our model, however,  subsidies  that are retaliated  against  by 
similar  subsidies  are nonetheless  likely to raise the welfare  of 
both countries.16  This  is because they will  drive the world economy 
to a situation  like subsidized  first best  optimum depicted  in Figure 
4.  Note  further that subsidies  beyond the point where the marginal 
product  of labor in the primary  and secondary  sectors are equated 
are  inefficient  in both open and closed economies. 
Gauging  the Importance  of Labor Rents 
Under most plausible  estimates, the wage differential  effects 
point has also  been  made by Dickens and  Lang  (1988). 26 
stressed  here are of greater  importance  for trade policy  than the 
product  market  monopoly  rent shifting  effects discussed  in recent 
work on strategic  trade policy.  The social return to increased 
investment  in the presence of wage differentials  can easily  be as 
much as 50 percent  greater  than the private  gain.  The point may be 
illustrated  more strongly by considering  two recent studies  of 
strategic  trade policies-—Baldwin  and Krugman's  (1987a,b)  study of 
European  subsides  to Airbus  Industrie  for the development  of the 
A300  jet; and Dixit's  (1988) study of trade  in automobiles. 
Baldwin and Krugman  construct  a simple simulation  model 
incorporating  both  learning  curve effects and strategic  interactions 
in aircraft  industry.  Their data indicate  that the  subsidy had very 
substantial  effects on the  allocation  of airplane production  between 
the United  States and Europe.  It also reduced pricas  in the 
industry  considerably.  The Baldwin-Krugman  analysis  suggests  that 
the subsidy program  cost $1.47 billion  in profits  for the European 
airline  industry,  and increased  the consumer  surplus  of European 
customers  by $1.43 billion,  leading to only a negligible  change  in 
economic  welfare.  Their analysis  takes no account  of the  rents 
gained by labor as it moved from lower—wage  industries  into the 
high-wage  airplane  industry,  however.  A  policy  analysis  should not 
treat the  rent component  of the wage  bill  as a social cost of 
production  but  as a component  of the social surplus generated  by the 
industry.17 
17This point is well known from the  development literature  on 
project  evaluation  (e.g. Sah and Stiglitz,  1985). 27 
To estimate  the  "labor rent" effects of the Airbus  program, we 
assumed alternatively  that compensation  in the entire product  chain 
of airplanes  was  25 percent higher than  the economy average  and that 
it was  25 percent  higher  in only the  final stage of production  -- 
airline assembly.  Combining  these  figures with Baldwin  and 
Krugman's  estimates  of the diversion  of sales towards the Airbus 
consortium  and information  on the labor's share  in  airplane 
production  permits  a rough estimate  of the  labor rent shifting 
effect of the Airbus subsidy of the A300. 
The results  in Table  3  indicate that once labor rent 
considerations  are recognized,  the overall  assessment  of the Airbus 
program  for Europea-welfare turns  from marginally  negative  to 
strongly  positive.  Even in the less favorable  case,  the subsidy 
generates  a welfare  gain representing  about  half its cost.  The 
estimated  gain  would be far greater,  recognizing  the high level  of 
unemployment  in Europe, if we assumed that  some of those hired by 
Airbus would otherwise  have been unemployed. 
A similar conclusion  is suggested  by Dixit's recent study of 
the automobile  industry.  He finds that allowing  for labor rents  in 
the American  automobile  industry dramatically  alters the results  of 
his  analysis  based on imperfect competition  in the product  market. 
Policies  promoting  domestic production  that appear  undesirable 
without  taking account of labor market  imperfections  yield large 
gains  once the existence  of these imperfections  is acknowledged. 
More careful empirical  analysis  of more specific  incidents  is 
needed  before  firm judgments  about the potential  importance  of labor Table 3: Labor  Market  Rents and the Effects of the 
Airbus A300 Program on European  Welfarea 
Scenario 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
No labor  20% Labor rents  20% Labor rents 







Change in present  +1.43  +1.43  +1.43 
discounted  value of 
consumer surplus 
Change in present  -1.47  -1.47  -1.47 
discounted  value 
of profits 
Change in present  0.00  +0.90  +1.84 
discounted  value 
oE labor rents 
Net change in welfare  -0.04  +0.86  +1.80 
Notes: 
aAll figures  are in billions of dollars.  The computations  assume a S 
percent discount rate and cumulative  production  of 398 units over a 20 
year product cycle. 
bThe change  in labor rents  is computed  as the change  in the present 
discounted  value of shipments  for Airbus calculated  from the Baldwin- 
Krugmsn simulation ($15.41  billion) times  the ratio  of employee 
compensation to value of shipments  in the  X.I.S.  aircraft industry in 1985 
(0.291)  times  the share  of rents in employee  compensation  (0.20). 
cThe change  in labor  rents is computed in a manner analogous  to that 
described in note (b)  with the share  of employee compensation  in value 
added in the  X.I.S.  aircraft industry  in 1985 (0.596)  replacing  the  share 
of employee compensation  in value of shipments. 
Saurces: Adapted from Table S of Baldwin and Krugman (1987b).  The 
changes in present discounted  value of labor  rents are based on the 
authors own calculations.  Informstion  on employee compensation,  value of 
shipments,  and value added  for the  X.I.S.  aircraft industry (SIC 3721)  are 
from the Bureau of  Census,  1985 Annual Survey  of Manufactures, Statistics 
for Industry Groups  and Industries. 28 
rent shifting  can be made.  The examples here  were selected  by other 
authors because  of potentially  important  product  market 
imperfections.  It would be valuable  to examine industries,  such as 
steel,  that are noted  for large labor market  imperfections. 
Some  Possible  Objections 
Our analysis  so far has  assumed away rent seeking  behavior.  At 
least two types of rent seeking need to be considered.  First,  it is 
possible  that  wage  differentials  generate  wait unemployment  of the 
sort envisioned  by Harris  and Todaro  (1970).  In the extreme  case 
where the primary  sector hires randomly  each period  from a pool of 
waiting applicants,  w(l—u)=w0 where u is the unemployment  rate  in 
the primary  sector.  In this case, there is no gain to increasing 
primary  sector employment,  since for each job created  in the primary 
sector,  u/(l—u) workers move  from the  low wage sector  into 
unemployment  (Harberger, l971))8  A  more plausible  formulation  of 
wait  unemployment  would recognize  that incumbent  employees  typically 
retain  the rights to their jobs each period  so that only new 
openings  and those jobs where  the incumbent  worker has  quit or been 
terminated  are available  to be allocated  to the unemployed.  Under 
this scenario,  if workers  have positive  discount  rates  and enter the 
primary  sector  queue to the point  where the utility  of being in the 
queue equals the utility  of being employed  in the  low wage sector, 
18Since each new job created in the primary sector  removes 
11(1—u) workers  from secondary  employment  and since w  /(1—u)  = 
the social opportunity  cost of labor for an additiona2  job  in the 
primary  sector  equals the marginal  product of labor in the primary  secto 29 
extra employment  in the primary sector will  generate  less induced 
unemployment  than in the  initial case considered.  Thus,  a small 
subsidy to the primary sector  will still be desirable)9 
Furthermore,  if workers are able  to queue for high wage  jobs from 
low wage jobs,  rent seeking through wait  unemployment  may not be an 
important  problem. 
The  second type of rent  seeking behavior  involves  efforts to 
create wage differentials.  Union organizing  drives  are an obvious 
example.  If larger wage differentials  lead to larger employment 
subsidies,  such rent  seeking activity will be encouraged.  In this 
case, subsidies  to high  wage industries,  while  increasing  efficiency 
ex—post may create  large ex—ante inefficiencies  if they lead to more 
resources  being devoted  to trying to push up wages.  We doubt that 
this point is of vast practical  importance.  Union organizing 
budgets  and employer  resistance  expenditures  are trivial compared  to 
the rents earned  by union workers.  Taking  20% of he  workforce  to 
be unionized  and a 20% union compensation  effect implies that  4% of 
wages,  or about $75 billion a year  represents  rents. Union 
organizing  budgets in the U.S.  certainly  total  far less than $1 
billion.  Furthermore,  the evidence  surveyed  in the previous  section 
suggests  that most wage differentials  do not arise  from organizing 
activity. 
A different  line of argument  against policies  directed  at 
subsidizing  the primary  sector  stresses their  anti-egalitarian 
19 
See Sah and stiglitz  (1985) and the references  therein  for a 
more detailed  discussion  of wait unemployment  and the measurement  of 
the social  opportunity  cost of labor. 30 
consequences.  The essence  of such policies  is, after all, 
subsidizing  workers  who are receiving  relatively  high  wages.  The 
argument  is more subtle, however,  than it at first appears. 
Subsidies  to the primary  sector enlarge it, thereby  raising the 
probability  of secondary  sector workers being able to move  into the 
primary  sector.  Bulow and Summers  (1986) demonstrate  that  small 
subsidies  to the primary  sector are Pareto  improvements  relative  to 
laissez faire,  in the special case where all workers  are 
homogenepus,  movements  between  sectors can be characterized  by a 
Markov  process,  and efficiency  wage considerations  lead to constant 
lifetime utility  differences  between workers  in the two sectors. 
More generally,  efficiency  enhancing  subsidies  will  not produce 
Pareto  improvements,  particularly  if there are  some secondary  sector 
workers  who have no chance of getting primary  sector jobs because  of 
their lack  of skill.  It is of course possible to argue that  optimal 
subsidies  should be given to improve the allocation  of output,  and 
then  income redistribution  measures  should be used to offset  any 
perverse  distributional  consequences.20 
On balance,  the arguments  in this section  suggast that  there  is 
a legitimate  economic  argument  in support of policies  directed  at 
encouraging  production  in high—wage  sectors of the economy.  Even 
though such measures  are likely to increase wage differentials,  they 
20The  issue is a complex because policies  that tax high wage 
workers for the benefit  of low wage workers  will,  at least  in some 
efficiency  wage models,  have perverse  effects on the composition  of 
output by reducing  the relative  utility of primary  sector workers. 
Thus,  income redistribution  policies may undo the  allocative  effects 
of subsidies  to sectors with that pay wage premia. 31 
nevertheless  may increase  economic welfare.  Especially  in nonunion 
contexts,  it appears unlikely  that rent seeking  losses will outweigh 
the gains  achievable  through  increasing  high wage employment. 
IV.  Wage Differentials  and American  Trade Policies 
The belief  that  international  competition  is profoundly 
changing  the economic  landscape  and leading to the 
deindustrialization  of America  is often expressed  in debates over 
American  industrial  policy.  The crude argument that the United 
States  is losing its manufacturing  base to international  competitors 
is often put  forward as a justification  for policies  directed  at 
limiting  imports or spurring  exports.  In George Meany's  picturesque 
phrase,  "you cannot  have a healthy  economy based on everyone  doing 
everyone else's  laundry". 
The claim that the United  States might lose  its ability to 
compete  in all industries  rests on confusion.  As long  as foreigners 
are unwilling  to indefinitely  accumulate  claims on American  assets, 
the United States must ultimately  run a surplus.  The  interesting 
question  for structural  trade policy  is therefore  whether  trade 
balance with a  high level of both exports and imports or with alow 
level of both exports and  imports is preferable. 
To shed  light on this  issue, Tables  4 and 5 presents 
information  on the characteristics  of American  manufacturing 
industries,  distinguishing  between  "import"  and  "export"  industries. 
We focus only on manufacturing  because  of data limitations  regarding 
other sectors,  and because  manufacturing  accounts  for the lion's 32 
share  (about 2/3) of American  trade.21  Thedata  refer  to three- 
digit census  industries.  The number  of import or export  workers in 
each industry  is estimated  as the product  of the  industry's  total 
number  of employees  and the fraction  of total  industry  shipments 
represented  by imports or exports. 
Table 4 lists the manufacturing  industries  with the highest 
import and export  shares.  Most of the export  industries  rely 
heavily on high technology,  aircraft being a prominent  example.  The 
import  industries  are more  mixed, ranging  from footwear  to office 
machines  to motor vehicles.  Particularly  in the case of export 
industries,  it is striking  that durable and capital  goods play an 
important  role  in merchandise  trade. 
Intraindustry  trade is very important  even at the three digit 
level; the correlation  between  import and export  shares was  0.06 in 
1983.  To highlight  the differences between import and export 
workers,  the first three columns of Table  5 compare  the average 
characteristics  of the most  import and the most export  intensive 
industries with those of the entire manufacturing  sector. 
A clear  pattern  emerges  from the Table.  Relative  to the entire 
manufacturing  sector, export  industries  look much more like the 
primary  sector  firms described  by Doeringer  and Piore (1971), while 
import industries  look much  more like secondary  sector firms.  Wages 
in export  intensive  industries  are 12 percent  above average after 
adjusting  for skill differences,  while wages in import  intensive 
21See  Dickens and Lang  (1988)  for consideration  of the  relation 
between U.S. trade and wages outside of the manufacturing  sector. Table 4: High  Import Penetration  and Export Supply Ratio  Three-Digit 
Censua  Industries  in  U.S. Manufacturing 
--  1983 
CIC 
Industries  Employing Top 10% of 




Log Wages  Premium 
nettation  Ratio5 
Employment 
(l000s) 
381 Watches,  Clocks, and  .511  .085  - .242  14.6 
Watchcsses 
221 Footwear,  Except Rubber  .511  .024  - .174  119.6 
222 Leather Products  .371  .041  - .166  49.7 
391 Jewelry and Misc.  .335  .084  - .120  278.6 
Manufacturing 
261 Pottery  .332  .108  - .142  37.5 
321 Office and  Accounting  .283  .148  .069  66.3 
Machines 
390 Toys, Amusements,  and  .260  .113  - .095  96.4 
Sporting Goods 
151 Apparel  and Accessories  .214  .016  - .216  1014.9 
351 Motor Vehicles  .204  .087  .174  658.6 
Industries  Employing  Top 10% of  Workers by  Export  Supply  Ratioc 
CIC  Industry  X/S  M/(M+S) 
Log  Wage  Premium 
Employment 
(l000s) 
352 Aircraft  and Aircraft  .438  .051  .153  527.0 
Parts 
312 Construction Machinery  .318  .059  .110  346.7 
322 Electronic  Computing  .263  .115  .083  354.4 
Equipment 
310 Engines and Turbines  .252  .053  .227  95.6 
371 Scientific  Instruments  .235  .111  .020  264.4 
361 Railroad Equipment  .208  .070  .194  25.0 
191 Agricultural  Chemicals  .183  .055  .035  45.9 
192 Industrial  Chemicals  .173  .081  .169  322.6 
Notes: 
tmThe employment  weights used in calculations  for the Top 10% import workers 
are actual  employment  for the top 8 industries and 67,200 for motor vehicles. 
bLog  wage premiums are calculated  from separate regressions  on  union  and 
nonunion  ssmples from the Full  Year  1983 CPS. The log wage  premium  for an 
industry equals  ([(UD + 0.192)*UCOV3  + NUD*(l-UCOV)(  where  UD is the estimated 
industry wage  premium  for union workers, NIJD is the premium  for nonunion 
workers, UCOV is the fraction  of  workers in  the industry  covered by  union 
agreements,  and 0.192  is the estimated  union-nonunion  wage  differential  fot 
the Full Year 1983 CPS from  Katz  (1986). 
cThe  employment  weights used in calculations  for the Top 10% export  workers 
are actual employment  for the top  7  industries  snd 185,800 for industrial 
chemicals. 
Sources: NBER  Trade-Immigrstion-Libor  Market  Data  Set and Dickens-Katz  (1987a) 
Industry Data  Set. Table  5: characteristics  of Typical laport and Export Workers  in 
U.S. l1anufacturing Industries  -  1983 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Typical  Top 10%  Top 10%  Typical  Typical 
Manuf.  Imports  Exports  Import  Export 
Worker  .  Worker  Worker 
Average Hourly  Wage  8.88  6.03  10.37  8.36  9.60 
for Production  Workers  (1.93) 
Log  Wage Premium  0.00 
- .163  .116 
- .022  .054 
for All Workers  (.115) 
Log Wage  Premium  0.00 
- .135  .128  - .015  .059 
for Nonunion  Workers  (.10) 
Pct. Wage Premium  0.00  - .214  .071  - .051  .035 
for union Workers  (.12) 
Percent Female  33.7  68.5  24.8  40.3  28.2 
(18.5) 
Percent Immigrants  S.l  17.0  6.6  10.0  7.3 
(4.3) 
Percent Black  10.3  12.3  7.1  10.7  8.7 
(3.6) 
Percent Unionized  29.8  27.4  28.0  30.1  29.7 
(13.9) 
R&D Expenditures  as  2.9  1.1  8.7  3.1  5.5 
a Percent of Sales  (3.5) 
Percent Production  68.2  79.8  52.1  70.9  62.4 
Workers  (13.1) 
Average Years  of  13.1  12.0  14.1  12.9  13.5 
Schooling  (0.8) 
Value Added  Per Worker  50.5  28.8  59.3  45.4  54.2 
(thousands  of  dollars)  (22.6) 
M/(M+S)  (in percent)  9.7  27.0  7.8  18.5  10.0 
(8.2) 
X/S  (in percent)  9.0  4.4  30.6  9.0  18.5 
(9.2) 
columns  (1), (2),  and (3)  are three-digit  census  industry averages weighted  by 
industry employment.  Import and Export  rankings based  on  1983 trade data. 
columns  (2)  and (3) present average characteristica  of  the top 10% of workers 
by industry M/(M+S) and  X/S respectively.  colummn  (4)  presents  three-digit 
census  industries  weighted  by industry employment  times M/S. column  (5) 
presents  three-digit  census  industries weighted  by industry employaent  times 
X/S. The numbers  in parentheses  are standard deviations. 
M = imports, X = exports, S = shipments  of  domestic producers. 
Sources:  Dickens-Katz  1983 Industry Data Set described  in  Dickens and  Katz 
(1987) and  NBER  Trade-Immigration-Labor  Market  Industry Data Set. 33 
industries  are 16 percent  below average.  Roughly  similar 
differentials  are observed  for both  union and non—union  workers. 
The widely cited examples  of automobiles  and steel, where very high 
wage industries  face substantial  import penetration  and are  almost 
completely  unable  to export, appear  to be atypical.  The general 
pattern is that export intensive  industries  are the ones with 
substantial  wage premia. 
Reflecting  patterns  of American  comparative  advantage,  export 
intensive  industries  in the United  States also employ more skilled 
workers  and do more research  and development  than import  intensive 
industries.  Export intensive  industries  devote 8.7 percent  of sales 
to research  and development,  compared to 1.1 percent  for import 
intensive  industries.  The average worker  in export intensive 
industry  has  14 years of schooling,  compared  with 12 years  for the 
average worker  in import intensive  industry.  Import  intensive 
industries  also disproportionately  employ women,  blacks and 
immigrants,  whereas export  industries  employ these workers  to less 
than the  average extent. 
The  comparisons  in columns  4 and 5 of the characteristics  of 
the  industries  employing  typical  export and  import workers  suggest 
all  of the same qualitative  conclusions  as the more extreme 
comparisons  of export  and import intensive  industries.  Industry 
differences  are attenuated  because export and  import intensive 
industries  often coincide  because of the  importance  of intraindustry 
trade.  Nonetheless,  the wage differential  between  the typical 
worker  in import and export intensive  industry  is about 8 percent. 34 
These results  suggest that for the United States,  policies 
which succeed  in promoting  trade and  increasing the volume of both 
exports and imports will tend to raise welfare, by moving workers 
from lower to higher wage  industries.  The gains are potentially 
significant.  For example, the estimates here suggest that 
eliminating  a manufacturing  trade  deficit  of $150 billion  by raising 
exports rather  than  by reducing  imports would  increase  labor rents 
by at least  $12 billion.  If export intensive  industries  were 
expanded relative  to import intensive  industries,  the gains could be 
up to three times as great. 
International  Comparisons 
We have already documented  that the wage  structure  is very 
similar  in all countries.  It follows that there is no way in which 
all countries  can disproportionately  export  goods produced  with high 
wage  labor.  A reasonable  conjecture  is that one concomitant  of 
increased  economic  development  is increased  comparative  advantage  in 
the  production  of primary  sector goods.  To examine this 
possibility,  Table 6 presents  evidence  on the American wage premium 
of import and  export intensive  industries  for a number  of countries, 
along with information on the American  wage premium  associated  with 
the industries  employing typical  export and import workers. 
The data provide  initial support for our conjecture  about 
patterns  of economic  development.  Korea imports goods produced  by 
high  wage  industries  and exports goods produced  by low wage 
industries.  This  is not simply a consequence  of their abundance  of Table  6:  U.  .S.  Log Wage  Premia  of  Typical Import  and Export  Workers 
in Manufacturing  in Nine  Countries,  1983 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Typical  Typical  Typical  Top 10%  Bottom  10% 
Country  Manuf. 







Australia  .006  .019  .063  .132  .034 
Chile  - .024  - .000  .017  .013  .055 
France  .016  .037  .053  .110  .020 
Germany  .045  .021  .051  .145  - .106 
Japan  .002  - .012  .030  .134  - .113 
South Korea  -.039  .020  - .089  - .216  .077 
Sweden  .030  .001  .035  .053  - .045 
United  Kingdom  .014  .013  .027  .082  - .128 
United  States  .000  - .004  .033  .051  - .170 
Notes: 
a. Three-digit  ISIC US industry log wage  premia  weighted by each country's 
industry employment. 
b. Three-digit  ISIC US industry log 
industry employment  times M/S. 
wage  premia  weighted by each country's 
c.  Three-digit  ISIC US industry log wage  premia  weighted by each country's 
industry employment  times X/S. 
This table utilizes  data from 18 ISIC manufacturing  industries:  321,  322,  323, 
324,331, 332, 341,  342,  351,  355, 361, 362, 371, 372, 381, 382,  383,  384. 
Sources: Trade  flow  data on an  ISIC basis were  provided  by Robert  Stern  of  the 
University  of  Michigan.  The U.S. industry log  wage premium variable 
aggregates  using  employment weights  the variable  described  in  note (b) of 
Table  4 from  3-digit Census  industries  to  ISIC industries.  Employment  data  are 
from  the United  Nations,  Industrial  Statistics Yearbook,  1984, volume .1,  1986. 35 
low skilled labor.  The wage premia used in these comparisons  are 
estimated  controlling  for measured  labor quality,  and the  evidence 
cited in Section II suggests  that they do not primarily  reflect 
unobserved  aspects of skill.  Most of the developed  countries  appear 
to export relatively  high  wage premium goods while importing 
relatively  low—wage  goods.  It is interesting  that the difference  in 
wage premiums between  high and  low net export  industries  is 
particularly  pronounced  in Germany and Japan. 
The observation  that  specialization  in high wage industries  is 
correlated  with per—capita  income might  be taken  as evidence  in 
favor of policies  encouraging  the growth  of these  industries.  Such 
an inference  would be premature,  however.  It seems plausible  that 
improved  technology,  management,  or worker skills would lead 
countries  to shift towards  capital intensive  industries  requiring 
investment  in job specific human capital and highly  motivated 
workers.  Moving  workers  from low to high wage  industries  is likely 
to lead to increases  in static allocative  efficiency.  Whether  or 
not  it would  lead to increases  in rates of growth  is more 
problematic. 
Trends  in American  Trade 
Discussions  of American  competitiveness  have differed  on 
whether  the changing  trade patterns  of recent years are  simply the 
consequence  of aberrant  exchange  rate movements  brought  about 
macroeconomic  policies  and speculative  forces, or are  instead the 
result  of long term structural  deterioration.  A central  issue  in 36 
the deindustrialization  debate  is whether or not the United States 
has suffered  particularly  severe competitive  losses in "good 
industries",  variously  defined as those that emphasize  technology  or 
have high value  added per worker.  The analysis  in the preceding 
section suggests that examining  the relative  performance  of high and 
low wage industries  probably  provides  the best way  of getting  at 
this issue. 
Assuming fixed ratios of employment  to shipments,  Table 7 
indicates  how changing  trade patterns  have affected  employment  in 
high and low wage  industries.  Between 1960 and  1980, the number  of 
jobs displaced  by imports was approximately  equal to the number  of 
jobs created by exports.  Particularly  during the l970s,  increased 
imports led to a reallocation  of labor out of the  lowest wage jobs 
in the manufacturing  sector.  Increased US exports  led to increases 
employment  in high wage sectors of the economy.  During the  1980s, 
the fraction  of workers  employed  in producing  tradeable  goods 
declined  as the trade deficit  increased.  Between  1980 and  1984, the 
last year  for which we have data available,  the  increase  in the 
trade deficit was  associated  with a reduction  of 1.4 million workers 
producing  traded manufacturing  goods.  Over 600,000 or 43% of these 
workers worked  in the quartile  of industries that  paid the  lowest 
wages.  This  reflects  the substantial  increase  in import penetration 
in industries  like apparel during the early l980s. 
These results  conflict  dramatically  with popular stereotypes 
suggesting  that the United States  is being  forced away  from cutting 
edge industries.  We suspect that the popular  misconception  results Notes: 
aThe  loss in  employment  from imports for 
defined as [(M., 
- 
M.5) 
* (L/Q).] where 
of employment  to output  in industry i in  1984.  Imports and output  are 
measured  in  quantities with their nominal values deflated  by  the 4-digit SIC 
industry shipments deflator  from  the Annual  Survey of  Manufactures.  The gain 
in  employment  from exports  is analogously defined  with exports replacing 
imports.  The trade flow, employment, and output data is from  the NBER  Trade- 
Immigration-Labor  Market  data  set. 
blndustries were ranked by the industry wage premium variable  defined  in note 
(b) of  Table 4 and  placed  into quartiles based  on  1983 employment. 
Table  7:  The Direct  Impact of  International  Trade  on  Employment 
By Wage  Class, U.S. Manufacturing  1960-84 
Change in  employment  (in thousands)  from': 
Wage Premium Classb  Imports  Exports  Net Exports 
Overall Manufacturing 
Lowest  quartile 
Second  quartile 
1960-84  -2621.3  1107.1  -1514.2 
1980-84  -1248.0  -168.4  -1416.5 
1970-80  -941.5  946.7  5.2 
1960-70  -431.7  328.9  -102.9 
1960-84  -1021.7  71.8  -950.0 
1980-84  -576.2  -60.7  -636.9 
1970-80  -307.6  113.3  -194.3 
1960-70  -138.0  19.2  -118.8 
1960-84  -457.2  323.0  -134.1 
1980-84  -217.7  10.1  -207.6 
1970-80  -177.5  242.8  65.3 
1960-70  -61.9  70.1  8.2 
1960-84  -547.8  271.5  -276.2 
1980-84  -220.5  -70.1  -290.6 
1970-80  -229.9  251.5  21.6 
1960-70  97.4  90.1  -7.2 
Highest Ouartile 
1960-84  -594.7  440.8  -153.9 
1980-84  -233.7  -47.6  -281.3 
1970-80  -226.6  339.1  112.5 
1960-70  -134.4  149.4  15.0 
Third  quartile 
industry  i from period  t to t'  is 
M is imports and (L/Q). is the ratio 37 
from the  fact that traded goods  industries as a  whole pay higher 
wages than the  rest of the economy.  In a period  when the trade 
deficit  rises, good jobs are  lost.  But these jobs  are likely  to 
come back when the trade deficit returns to balance.22  There 
appears  to be little  evidence  through 1984 of relative  deterioration 
in the high wage of portion  of the American  traded goods sector. 
These patterns  should  not be surprising.  Postulate  that 
"cutting  edge industries"  pay wage premia.  Following  the discussion 
of Kruginan  and Baldwin  (1987)  assume that  other nations  are catching 
up with the United  States.  They then make  incursions  into the least 
progressive  sectors  of our economy,  causing U.S. workers  to move 
towards  high wage  industries. 
V.  Conclusion 
The analysis  in the preceding  sections  suggests that 
imperfections  in the labor  market  may have at least as much 
significance  as imperfections  in product markets  for trade policies. 
Labor market rents  earned by workers  in high—wage  industries  are 
very large relative  to plausible  estimates  of monopoly  profits. 
Unlike  the case  of product  market  imperfections where optimal 
policies  are not  robust to small changes  in assumptions  about 
corporate  strategies,  the theoretical  case  for policies  which 
promote  high wage premium  industries  is reasonably  robust.  Given 
that export  industries  in the United States have considerably  higher 
22  On the other hand,  see Baldwin and Krugman  (1986) for an 
argument  that transitory  exchange  rate shocks may permanently  affect 
an economy's  ability to compete  in some industries. 38 
wages than import  competing  industries  even after  controlling  for 
observed  worker  skill measures,  our theoretical  arguments  suggest 
that export promoting  policies  are much more  likely to promote 
economic welfare  than import competing  policies. 
There  are of course a number of other considerations  that must 
be weighed  before any policy  judgments  are made.  First, following 
much of the literature,  we have abstracted  from the possibility  that 
some  industries  generate  technological  externalities.  If such 
externalities  are generated,  and are limited by national  boarders, 
there is a strong case for encouraging  the growth  of externality 
generating  industries.  Second,  if wages are very  sensitive  to the 
rents earned  by firms, it is possible  that  product  market  effects 
are more important  than  we have suggested  but show up as labor 
market  rents.  Third, we have ignored input—output  considerations  in 
our  discussion  implicitly  assuming  that all output  is produced  in 
the industry  making  a given shipment.23  Fourth, we have  ignored 
political  considerations  that might lead activist  policyTnakers to 
take steps  that reduce rather than increase efficiency  once the 
decision  to undertake  industrial policy  was  taken. 
Despite these  limitations, we believe  that our results 
strengthen  the  economic  case against import protecting  policies  and 
for export promoting  policies.  In future research,  it would be 
Useful  to employ  a general equilibrium  model  like those developed  by 
23Dickens  and Lang  (1988) find that taking  into account  input- 
output relations  does not greatly affect one's  conclusions 
concerning  the cross—sectional  relations  among wage premiums  and 
trade  flows in the United States. 39 
Shoven  and his collaborators  to explore more precisely  the  impact of 
various  policies  in the presence  of non—competitive  wage 
differentials.  Of particular  interest  would be a reevaluation  of 
the  1986 Tax Reform Act which appears to have heavily  burden the 
high—wage  durable goods  manufacturing  sector of the  economy. 40 
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